Beijing might escalate to the use of land-based missiles and aircraft later in a battle, depending on initial results. In general terms, a possible naval blockade of Taiwan offers advantages to China. For this scenario, unlike that of an attempted invasion, trends in technology favor rather than hurt China, since it would be the actor threatening large military objects like ships and airfields and ports. To minimize China’s own vulnerabilities, People’s Liberation Army Navy attack submarines might be the principal assets employed, rather than surface ships or aircraft. Cyberattacks would likely support the physical operation.
Given China’s dramatic military modernizations of recent times, the situation is now much more complex. Recent analysis that I have done at Brookings indicates that especially for certain types of blockade scenarios by which China might seek to squeeze Taiwan into submission, the United States and its allies might still win a war in which they sought to break the blockade.
dominance in advanced air and naval weaponry meant that we almost surely could have come to Taiwan’s defense and prevailed. These doctrinal debates over strategic ambiguity versus strategic clarity seem strangely disconnected from military reality.Īmerica’s policy of strategic ambiguity was born during the Cold War, when it was a simple fact that the United States enjoyed overwhelming military dominance against China in the waters and airways of the western Pacific. Even though Taiwan was 100 miles from China and thousands of miles from the United States, U.S. But here’s the real rub: Saying we WOULD defend Taiwan militarily does not mean we COULD do so successfully.
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